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INTRODUCTION
COME NOW Ilo Marie Grundberg and Janice Gray, plaintiffs and
appellees, and timely file this Petition for Rehearing pursuant to
Utah R.App.P.35.
in this

Appellees submit that in rendering the decision

cause, the majority

of

this

Court

has

overlooked

or

misapprehended certain points of law and fact which would require
that the majority opinion be vacated and the minority opinion be
made

the

judgment

of

this

Court.

To

that

end,

plaintiffs

respectfully file this petition for rehearing.
A,

The Court Has Overlooked The Inefficiency Of Or Misapprehended
The Efficiency Of The FDA And Abdicated Judicial Functions To
The Executive Branch
This

Court

longstanding

has

right

issued
to

rely

an

opinion

upon

the

impartial airing of its grievances.

reversing
judicial

the

system

public7s
for

an

Rather than relying upon the

crucible that the courtroom becomes in our adversarial system,
injured individuals in Utah have now been deprived by this courtmade

rule

of

the

full

benefit

of

strict

products

liability

protection when prescribed any drug product,1 particularly when
those individual rights were already subjected to the court-made
learned

intermediary

doctrine.

In

dissent,

observed that the Supreme Court of Utah had

Justice

"little basis for

abdicating judicial responsibility to the FDA."
Op. at p.19 (Stewart, J., dissenting).2

Stewart

Grundberg, Slip

Plaintiffs urge this Court

^
This Court held that H[p]laintiffs may still recover under a
strict liability claim by demonstrating that the product was
unreasonably
dangerous
due
to
an
inadequate
warning,
a
manufacturing flaw, mismarketing, or misrepresenting information to
the FDA.,f
Grundberg, Slip Op. at p.24 n.8 (erroneously labeled
footnote 7).
2
In submitting their first brief, plaintiffs adhered to Utah
R.App.P.41 and kept within the Record certified by this Court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to reconsider

the wisdom

of such

abdication

in light

of the

following discussion of the FDA's efficiency and integrity.
Congressional investigations time and again have demonstrated
that the FDA has repeatedly

approved

drugs

—

many

of which

eventually were withdrawn from the market for reasons of public
safety —

in complete ignorance of critical information either in

its own files or in the published medical literature, or both,
relating to the hazards of such drugs.

For example, the FDA

approved Oraflex on April 19, 1982, for the treatment of arthritis.
Eli Lilly withdrew the drug from the market on August 4, 1982, in
the wake of 11 reported deaths associated with the drug's use in
the United States and 61 reported deaths in the United Kingdom.
principal

concern

were reports

of serious

Oraflex-associated liver and kidney disease.

Of

and sometimes fatal
In a report entitled,

Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug "Oraflex", the
House Committee on Government Operations, ("H.C.G.O.") a principal
Congressional committee overseeing the FDA, found that in approving
Oraf lex for marketing, the FDA was unaware that it had received in
the Oraflex clinical trials four reports of serious concomitant
liver and kidney disease and two serious reports of kidney disease
unaccompanied

by liver injury.

At the time the FDA approved

Defendant Upjohn ignored that Rule and submitted a voluminous
Appendix.
As part of this Petition for Rehearing, plaintiffs
submit certain exhibits by an Appendix supporting their positions
and to rebut the one-sided picture shown through Upjohn's Appendix.
3
See Deficiencies in FDA's Regulation of the New Drug "Oraflex".
Fourteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations,
H.Rep.98-511, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983),, pages 9 and 10.
Appendix, Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A".
As a consequence of its
ignorance, the agency approved untruthful and misleading labeling
that confined Oraflex-associated liver reactions to "liver function
test abnormalities" which were "usually transient" and that denied
altogether the existence of "evidence . . . of renal [kidney]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Oraflex for marketing, and for several months thereafter, it was
unaware of the number of reports of Oraflex-associated deaths it
had received

prior

to

of the drug.4

its approval

Prior

to

approving Oraflex, the FDA made no effort to obtain information on
its safety from foreign countries in which it was already marketed
and was, therefore, unaware of a large number of reports of serious
and sometimes fatal reactions to the drug submitted to British and
Danish regulatory authorities.5

The FDA placed the public's health

at risk by failing to enforce the legal requirement that drug
manufacturers report all adverse reactions to a new drug under
clinical investigation, information essential to weigh the risks
against its potential benefits.6
The FDA approved Merital for the treatment of depression on
December

31, 1984.

Merital was withdrawn from the market in

January of 1986 because of a large number of reports of serious
immune-allergic

or hypersensitivity

reactions, including

fatalities, associated with its use.

several

In a report entitled, FDA's

Regulation of the New Drug Merital. the H.C.G.O. found that prior
to approving Merital, the FDA overlooked clinical evidence it had
received of the drug's allergy-inducing potential.7
failed

to

ensure

receipt

and

review

pertinent to the safety of Merital.8

of

information

The FDA's enforcement of its

toxicity in [the Oraflex] clinical studies.11
* Id. at pages 11-12.
H

important

The FDA also

Id. at pp.9-10.

Id. at page 13.

*

Id. at page 22.
See FDA's Regulation of the New Drug Merital. Fifteenth Report
by the Committee on Government Operations, H.Rep. 100-206, 100th
Cong.,
1st Sess.(1987), page 24. Appendix, Exhibit "B".
8
Id. at page 37.
This deficiency included:
a. important
articles in the published world literature 11relevant to the drug's
safety; and
b. labeling, "Dear Doctor
letters, and other
7
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adverse reaction reporting requirements was inadequate.

H.C.G.O.

concluded that the FDA exposed the American public to the potential
hazards of Merital without requiring that the drug's efficacy be
supported by substantial evidence derived from adequate and wellcontrolled studies, as mandated by law. °
The FDA approved Versed preoperative sedation, induction of
general anesthesia and conscious sedation for short diagnostic or
endoscopic procedures on December 20, 1985.

Thereafter, Versed was

associated with numerous reports of life-threatening and, in many
instances,

fatal

episodes

of

cardiac

and

respiratory

particularly when used for conscious sedation.

arrest,

The FDA concluded

that these reactions were dose-related, but not until November of
1987, were the recommended
substantially

reduced.

In

conscious sedation doses for Versed
a

report

entitled

FDA's

Deficient

Regulation of the New Drug Versed, the H.C.G.O., concluding that
the Versed doses originally approved for conscious sedation were
excessive,11 found that the recommended doses to which Versed had
been reduced were identical to those reported to be effective and
sufficient

in

marketing,

the

several
FDA

studies.

was

unaware

When
of

it
these

approved

Versed

important

for

studies,

notwithstanding that they had been prominently published in the
important regulatory information related to new drugs being
marketed outside the United States that are under FDA review. Id.
at pp. 37, 42.
9
Id. at page 71.
In particular, the FDA overlooked clear
evidence that Merital's manufacturer failed to submit Meritalassociated safety information, as required by law. Id.
10
Id. at p.80.
11
See Deficiencies in FDA/s Regulation of the New Drug Versed.
Seventy-First Report by the Committee on Government Operations,
H.Rep.100-1086, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), p.10.
Appendix,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "C".
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medical literature12 and, in many instances, had been submitted to
the agency
files.13

and were,

thereforef

retrievable

from

the agency's

H.C.G.O. also found that the FDA was not aware of the

manner in which Versed was regulated in foreign nations.14

The

FDA's enforcement of its reporting requirements continued to be
grossly deficient.

Most notably, the FDA failed to investigate the

adverse reaction reporting practices of the manufacturer of Versed,
notwithstanding

data

the agency

had received

from the company

strongly suggesting that the firm had neglected to submit to the
agency reports of Versed-associated deaths known to it prior to the
drug's approval.15
The FDA approved Zomax on October 29, 1980, for the relief of
mild to moderately severe pain.

On March 4, 1983, marketing of the

drug was halted by its manufacturer due to a very large number of
allergic/anaphylactoid
Eventuallyf
FDA.

reactions

associated

with

its

use.

more than 2f100 such reactions were reported to the

In a report

entitled,

FDA's Regulation

H.C.G.O. found that the FDA approved

of Zomax.16 the

Zomax in violation of an

agency policy requiring that its benefits be shown to outweigh its
demonstrated carcinogenic risk.17

Again, FDA failed to make the

1:2

Id. at page 20.
Id. at page 21.
14
Specifically, the agency did not know that: (a) Versed had been
labeled for use abroad at substantially lower conscious sedation
doses than had been approved in the United States; and (b) actions
had been taken by foreign regulatory agencies to reduce the
solution concentration of Versed and thereby minimize the risk of
overdosing patients on Versed. Id. at page 25.
\ Id. at page 37.
16
See FDA's Regulation of Zomax, Thirty-First Report by the
Committee on Government Operations, H.Rep.No. 98-584, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess.(1983). Appendix, Plaintiffs' Exhibit lfDM.
17
Id. at page 5.
\\
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risk/benefit analysis this Court has placed within the exclusive
province

of

the

FDA.

Also,

the

FDA's

monitoring

associated adverse reaction reports was deficient.

of

Zomax-

When Zomax was

removed from the market, the agency's computerized tracking system
showed

that

associated

the

FDA

had

only

received

allergic/anaphylactoid

270

reports

reactions, whereas

of

Zomax-

the drug's

manufacturer had actually submitted 900 to the agency.18

The FDA

also failed to note evidence in its possession suggesting that
Zomax posed a higher risk of serious and sometimes life-threatening
allergic/anaphylactoid

reactions than other drugs in its class,

particularly among patients with no prior history of allergy to
Zomax or any other drug.19
The FDA is neither infallible, self-informed nor omniscient.
That

agency,

like

others, depends upon

the

industry which it

regulates, and it seldom knows that which is not highlighted in the
submissions made to it.

This Court should

consider carefully

before sanctioning the FDA as the ultimate authority speaking to
the safety of prescription drugs.20
Numerous

articles

have

discussed

the

task

of

the

new

Commissioner of the FDA in light of the decreasing efficiency,
declining morale and eroding credibility
Congress and consumers.
time

of

Dr.

David

of the FDA with both

In an article published at or about the

Kessler's

appointment

as

Commissioner,

the

Washington Post reported that:
13

Id. at pages 11-12.
Id. at page 16.
20
Halcion received final approval for marketing on November 15,
1982,a date closely aligned with the approval problems related
above.
19

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The agency's credibility was damaged last year when four
FDA officials were caught accepting bribes to speed up
the approval of certain generic drugs.... Several of the
largest companies were caught sending the agency
fraudulent information about their drugs.... Inspections
of products and food and drug manufacturing plants
decreased from 36,528 in 1980 to 18,592 in 1989.
Seizures
of
contaminated
foods
or
adulterated
pharmaceuticals dropped from 539 in 1980 to 142 in
1989.... Kessler says one of his first priorities is
restoring credibility to the generic drug division. "We
have to be sure that the agency is clean and that
everyone who deals with it is clean/1 said Kessler....
Thompson, L., Finally, A New Chief For the FDA. The Washington
Post, Nov. 20, 1990, included in the Appendix as Exhibit "Elf. The
Associated Press reported:
The Food and Drug Administration,
its reputation
tarnished by the generic drug scandal, is trying to
restore its credibility by strengthening enforcement
across the range of its authority, the agency's new chief
[Dr. David Kessler] said Wednesday. >There has to be a
sense out there that there is a will to carry out the
statute,'
.... * Ensuring the accuracy of the data
presented to this agency is a high priority,' said
Kessler....
After
uncovering
fraud,
bribery
and
corruption in the generic drug industry and the FDA's
generic drug division, the agency changed the drugapproval process for these products.
*The honor system
is out the window,' Kessler said.
FDA inspectors now
audit
the
information
in companies' drug-approval
applications to verify that the data is correct....
Previously, the agency relied on companies to be
truthful. But the scandal uncovered numerous instances
in which companies cheated on safety and effectiveness
tests required for FDA approval. Dozens of drugs were
taken off the market as a result....
The Associated Press, Feb. 27, 1991, Appendix, Exhibit "F".
In these and in the numerous other articles which have been
published in recent months,21 the relative ineffectiveness of the
FDA has been noted.

The articles recognize that the problems at

the FDA are pervasive.

H

*It is glaringly apparent that the FDA

21
Included within the Appendix as cumulative Exhibit H 6 H is a
collection of articles discussing the condition of the FDA and the
impact of Dr. Kessler's appointment and confirmation thereon.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cannot now execute all of its statutory responsibilities within the
limitations of existing resources.' said [an advisory panel in a
draft

report]

prepared

by

15

experts

chosen

by

the

agency."

Newsday, April 12, 1991, included in the Appendix as Exhibit "H".
"A Federal Advisory Committee appointed to study the Food and Drug
Administration

says the agency

is overwhelmed

and incapable of

coping with vastly increased duties caused by the AIDS epidemic, a
flood

of

food

technology."

imports

and

advances

in

medical

science

and

N.Y.Times, April 11, 1991, included in the Appendix

as Exhibit "I".

"In a draft of its final report, the panel of 15

experts says that F.D.A. laboratories and equipment are in abysmal
condition, that some food factories are inspected only once every
eight years and that the agency no longer has adequate scientific
ability

to

evaluate

new

drugs,

much

less

keep

up

with

*revolutionary advances occurring in the biological and medical
sciences./H
These
leaders

Id.
articles

and

mission.22

reflect

scientists

that

the
the

consensus
FDA

has

among
not

Congressional
fulfilled

its

To eliminate the judicial arena as one forum wherein is

considered a prescription drug product's safety and efficacy and to
rely entirely upon the FDA for the resolution of such concerns is
to place the well-being of the public into the bureaucratic hands
of a federal agency all too subject to the vagaries of politics and
72

See also the General Accounting Office's Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee On Human Resources and Intergovernmental
Relations,
Committee
On
Government
Operations.
House
of
Representatives: FDA Drug Review-Post-approval Risks 1976-85, page
57, included in the Appendix as Exhibit "J". (51.5% or 102 of 198
drugs analyzed have serious post-approval risks requiring labelling
changes or withdrawal from the market.)
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personalities.

Plaintiffs

urge

this

Court

to

reconsider

its

decision establishing the FDA as the forum of last resort for the
citizens of Utah.
B.

The Court Overlooked Or Misapprehended The Impact of The
Court's Opinion Discouraging Safer And More Efficacious Drugs.
This Court identified several policy reasons as supporting its

decision to afford protection from a strict product liability claim
to all prescription drugs.

In dissent, Justice Stewart addressed

those policy reasons and identified competing policies militating
against such protection.

Plaintiffs submit that Justice Stewart

has provided powerful reasons not to grant prescription drugs the
unwarranted protection approved by the majority.
In

addition,

this

Court's

opinion

overlooks

the

powerful

motivation such protection fosters in manufacturers to achieve the
approval, at whatever costs to scientific integrity, of the FDA.
While such protection might drive some manufacturers to present
their data in a more forthright manner, it is equally likely that
many manufacturers will conduct themselves in the manner alleged by
plaintiffs in the pending products liability case against Upjohn.
That is, seeing the protection to be obtained through FDA approval,
many manufacturers may misrepresent in the voluminous submissions
to the FDA the scientific truth about the safety and efficacy of a
particular drug.
Few plaintiffs have either the technical

expertise or the

extensive resources necessary to evaluate the truthfulness of a
drug manufacturer's submissions to the FDA.

As the reports and

articles discussed above indicate, even the FDA has been unable to
examine for comparison purposes the accuracy and completeness of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the summaries and technical reports submitted to it by a drug
manufacturer with the underlying clinical trials data.

The very

breadth of the protection afforded to drug manufacturers by the
Supreme Court of Utah will encourage deception at the approval
stage•
Moreover, granting drug manufacturers even limited protection
from strict

liability

for all drugs upon approval by the FDA

creates a disincentive to engage in research and development toward
making that particular drug, or a derivative thereof, safer and
more

efficacious.

Once

approval

has

been

obtained

a

drug

manufacturer has little incentive to fulfill its duty to remain
abreast of scientific developments.
Sons, Inc.,

682 P.2d

832, 835

See Barson v. E.R.Squibb &

(Utah 1984).

M

[P]ublic policy

militates against finding as a matter of law that FDA approval of a
particular

drug

relieves

a

pharmaceutical

company

of

further

responsibility to continue research and testing to develop safer
products."

MacGillivray v. Lederle Laboratories, 667 F.Supp. 743,

745 (D.N.M. .1987) .

The court in MacGillivray recognized that "a

tort judgment against a drug manufacturer may in fact accelerate
development of better, safer products ....

Id.

The protection afforded to drug manufacturers by this Court
will encourage scientific stagnation rather than promote public
safety.23

Pharmaceutical manufacturers now will rest on the FDA's

approval and use it as a broad shield against liability while at
the same time recognizing it as a disincentive to further reporting
73

See Page! Generic Product Risks; The Case Against Comment K
And For Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 853 (1983), as well
as Wagner, Strict Liability Isn't A Problem - It's A Solution,
Vol.19: 1, 13(1989). Appendix, Plaintiffs' Exhibit K.
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research and development.

4

In light of these policies, plaintiffs

urge this court to reconsider its decision.
C.

The Court Has Overlooked Or Misapprehended The Traditional
Focus of Strict Liability Upon The Product Rather Than
Conduct.
Indeed,

the

approach

adopted

by

this

Court

dramatically

undermines the very core of the doctrine of strict liability by
focusing upon the conduct of both the manufacturer and the FDA
rather than upon the product itself.
In strict liability, the plaintiff is not required to
impugn the conduct of the maker or other sellers[,] but
he is required to impugn the product.
Under section
402A, it is said that the product must be in a *defective
condition unreasonably dangerous.'
This simply means
that the product must be defective in the kind of way
that subjects persons or tangible property to an
unreasonable risk of harm.
Prosser And Keeton On Torts (5th Ed.1984), §99 at p.695.25

This

Court so held in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co. . 601 P.2d
152, 158 (Utah 1979), recognizing that a manufacturer is strictly
liable even where "the [manufacturer] has exercised all possible
24
Plaintiffs submit that this decision is inconsistent with
current Utah law as contained in the open courts and remedies
provisions of the Utah Constitution at Article I, §11- See also
Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985). Therein, this Court recognized the propensity of defects in
drug products and injuries caused thereby to appear many years
after the initial marketing or use of such products. Id. at 674.
25
The rule as contained in Section 402A "renders the maker of a
product strictly liable to consumers or users for harm caused to
them in the course of a foreseeable use of the product by its
unreasonably dangerous conditions or qualities, without respect to
fault ....H Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts Vol 5, §28.15
at p.445-45 (2d.Ed.1986) (emphasis added). MIn strict liability,
the central issue is the character of the product, not the conduct
of the parties." Lee and Lindahl, Modern Tort Law, Vol.2, §27.02
at p.546-47 (Rev.Ed.) (footnote omitted).
See also Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (the purpose
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the persons who are
powerless to protect themselves).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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care in the preparation and sale of his product ....w
With its opinion, this Court has eroded the full protection of
strict liability and placed burdens not envisaged by that law upon
persons injured by the product, rather than upon the manufacturer
of the product most able to bear such burdens and which chose to
place its products on the markets for profit.
principle for any court to determine

It is a dangerous

as a matter of law that the

executive branch of government, or a regulatory agency thereof,
fulfills the duties the law imposes upon that branch merely by
virtue

of

the

nature

legislative branch.

of

the

duties, relegated

to

it

by

Yet that is what this Court has done

the
and

not in the area of state law, but of all things, in the area of
federal law.
This Court's

decision disregards

the traditional

focus of

strict products liability law and returns emphasis to the conduct
of the parties.

In a strict products

liability case in Utah

involving prescription drug products, the emphasis will no longer
be upon the defective or dangerous character of the drug but upon
the conduct of the manufacturer and the approval process of the
FDA.

Underfunded plaintiffs who fail to carry such burdens will

suffer the often devastating lifelong effects of using a defective
product.

Plaintiffs urge this Court to return the focus to that

which has caused the harm - the product.
D.

The Court Has Overlooked Or Misapprehended The Impact Of This
Decision On The Learned Intermediary Doctrine And The Medical
Profession.
In rendering its opinion, while recognizing the viability of

the learned intermediary doctrine in Utah, this Court overlooked
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the effect

of such decision upon that doctrine, which already

serves as an impediment to an individual's action to recover for
injuries sustained pursuant to his or her use of a prescription
drug product.
or should

The doctrine provides that Mif a manufacturer knows

know

of a risk associated

with

its product,

it is

directly liable to the patient if it fails to adequately warn the
medical profession of that danger."
citing Barson, 682 P.2d at 835.

Grundberg, Slip Op. at p.l4#

In Barson. this Court stated:

The manufacturer of ethical drugs has the duty of making
timely and adequate warnings to the medical profession of
any dangerous side effects produced by its drugs of which
it knows or has reason to know.
The manufacturer is
directly liable to the patient for the breach of such
duty.
Barson, 682 P.2d at 835 (footnotes omitted).
With the instant decision, this Court has held that every
physician

who

prescribes

any prescription

drug

to his

or her

patient has by definition prescribed for that patient's use an
••unavoidably unsafe" product.
physician,

the

plaintiffs

In any action brought against such
therein

would

be

entitled

to

an

instruction to the jury that the drug or other prescription product
at issue is, as a matter of law, "unavoidably unsafe".

Whether

such conduct in any given situation violates the standard of care
will be a question for the jury.
that the physician-defendant

That the jury has been informed

prescribed

an

"unavoidably unsafe"

product is a species of evidence likely to sway a jury.
One result of this Court's decision to afford prescription
drug manufacturers protection from strict products liability, then,
is a possible diversion of liability for injuries suffered pursuant
to the use of prescription drugs from the manufacturer of such
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

drugs to the prescribing physician.

Physicians will be placed in

the awkward position, one which undermines the confidence critical
to a meaningful doctor-patient relationship, of informing their
patients that the drug product being prescribed is "unavoidably
unsafe", no matter how insignificant or how serious the illness,
disease or injury confronted by the patient, and no matter how
dangerous or how mild the medication prescribed.

Patients will

then face the difficult and paradoxical decision of whether to
consent

to

such treatment

in

light

of

this knowledge.

This

alteration in Utah law presents the possibility of a physician
deciding against use of prescription drugs because of his potential
exposure to this shifted liability, a result which furthers neither
the treatment of the patient nor the development and promotion of
new drug products, results which are contrary to the policies
sought to be furthered by the majority's decision.
Plaintiffs submit that this Court has overlooked the impact
its decision would have upon the learned intermediary doctrine in
Utah and upon the medical profession.

Plaintiffs urge this Court

to reconsider its opinion in light of this potentially explosive
situation.
Counsel

for

petitioners

certify

that

this

petition

is

presented in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs and their counsel recognize the significant issues
this Court faced in its deliberations in receiving and deciding
this case of first impression.

While plaintiffs1 views of the

legal issues and the justice of their cause are reflected in the
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courageous dissents, their appreciation and respect extend to all
the Court, and they are confident that this Petition for Rehearing
will receive this Court's continued careful consideration.
In light of the gravity of this case, the issues involved and
the severe ramifications of the Court's opinion upon Utah citizens
suffering drug related injuries and deaths, plaintiffs respectfully
request that this Court grant plaintiffs' petition for rehearing.
Only life-threatening conditions, injuries and diseases for
which a safer therapeutic alternative is not available warrant the
prescription

of unavoidably unsafe drugs.

As

its past record

indicated, the FDA, upon which the majority heavily relies, is
neither an effective nor an omnipotent policing, regulatory agency
inasmuch as it lacks both the resources and the expertise to do so.
Public policy dictates that courts should not engage in legislation
in

violation

of

the

separation

of

powers

provision

of

the

Constitution, for if Congress had such faith in the FDA, it should
pass the federal legislation needed to equal in scope this Court's
present decision.
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray that a rehearing be granted in this
case, that the majority decision as rendered by this Court be
vacated, and that the present minority opinion of this Court be
made the unanimous judgment of this Court.
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Respectfully submitted,
POPE, McGLAMRY,
KILPATRICK & MORRISON
720 Broadway
Post Office Box 2128
Columbus, Georgia 31902
(404) 324-0050

By:

V
C. Neal Pope S
Pro Hac Vice

By
Steven W. Saccoccia
Pro Hac Vice
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 533-9800

By: Z^fort^
H. Ross Workman
Utah State Bar No.A3556
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Utah State Bar No.A3341
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I have this day served the within and
foregoing Petition For Rehearing On Certified

Questions to The

Supreme Court of Utah By The United States District Court, District
of Utah Central Division, Honorable J. Thomas Greene, Jr., upon
counsel for defendant by delivering

four copies to appellant's

counsel of record to:
Thomas L. Kay, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and by Federal Express overnight delivery of an additional copy to:
Lane D. Bauer, Esq.
Steven E. Scheve, Esq.
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON
1 Kansas City Place
1200 Main Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64105
This y^Tday of June, 1991.
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